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Abstract This article contributes to the limited literatures
on small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using an institutional
theoretical framework, we analyzed fieldwork interviews
with twenty SMEs and perspectives of 165 SME managers
and workers in textiles, garment, and footwear industries,
the most important wage-earning sector in Vietnam. Having understood in the context of a developing ‘‘market
economy with socialist orientation’’ (thus a ‘‘Southern
perspective’’), we find that socially responsible practices
and expectations developed long before the arrival of CSR
as a western concept and an MNC agenda. While identifying and contributing ideas concerning forms of ‘‘informal’’ CSR practices—influenced by social and cultural
expectations—to the CSR/SME literature, we are conscious of the mixed effects of these practices and the ongoing nuanced negotiations between workers and managers
in these SMEs. In our research, we found that it takes both
domestic and international stakeholders to improve labor
conditions in Vietnam under the banner of CSR.
Keywords Socialist Vietnam  SME managers and
workers  Formal and informal CSR practices  Institutional
theory  Labor–management–state relations
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Introduction
Small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)1 often account
for up to 90 % of all registered firms in an economy, and
even more if the informal sector is included. In addition,
SMEs are important providers of employment and producers of a large share of total industrial output in developing countries (Spence et al. 2003; UNEP 2003;
Luetkenhorst 2004). Still, we have limited knowledge of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in SMEs compared to
that of large firms (Jenkins 2004; Morsing and Perrini
2009; Laudal 2010). There is even less knowledge of what
SMEs actually do in terms of CSR activities: why they
chose specific types of activities, or about the implications
of their actions (Jeppesen 2004; Vives 2006; Jamali et al.
2009; Skadegaard Thorsen and Jeppesen 2010).
In this article, we start with the idea that CSR can be
viewed as the societal expectations of businesses at a given
time (Frynas 2009). More specifically, we adopt Blowfield
and Frynas’ understanding of CSR as companies having a
responsibility: (a) for their impact on society and the natural environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and
the liability of individuals; (b) for the behavior of others
with whom they do business (e.g., within the supply
chains); and (c) to manage their relationship with the wider
society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to
add value to society (Blowfield and Frynas 2005, p. 503).
To exemplify this approach, we focus on labor–
1

No single definition of SMEs exists because governments, international organizations, and business associations represent different
economic and political interests and goals that require language and
structural differences in terminology. In this article, ‘SMEs’ are
defined as ‘registered entities having at least five employees and no
more than 299 employees,’ based on the official definition of SMEs in
the textile, garment and footwear sectors in Vietnam.
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management relations, bringing in the voices of managers
and workers in SMEs in the context of their formal and
informal CSR practices in the Vietnamese textiles, garment, and footwear manufacturing sectors.
It has been argued that the CSR agenda is ‘Northern,
MNC dominated’ (Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Newell and
Frynas 2007) and lacks perspectives from the Global
South’s developing nations, including their communities
and workers (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006) and local SMEs’
perspectives (Fox 2005). We agree with these critical
perspectives, which highlight the importance of context
(Blowfield and Frynas 2005; Blackman 2006b; PrietoCarron et al. 2006; Jamali et al. 2009; Jamali and Neville
2011; Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011) and the tensions
inherent in CSR due to it being a western concept introduced by developed countries (Blowfield and Frynas
2005). Indeed in developing countries, CSR might not be
known (Newell and Frynas 2007); it might be considered
an alien concept (Jamali et al. 2009) or viewed as part of a
‘western imperialist agenda’ (in Khan and Lund-Thomsen
with reference to Pakistan 2011).
The literature on CSR in SMEs, regardless of whether it
concerns a developed or developing nation, tends to focus on
what SMEs ‘should do with regard to CSR’ and is based on
what large firms do (Laudal 2010). Few of these contributions address SMEs in ‘their own right’ (Jenkins 2004), but
even then, SME perspectives are not included in these studies
(Williamson et al. 2006), or the SME studies lack theoretical
application (Lepoutre and Henne 2006; Jamali et al. 2009).
Even fewer studies focus on SMEs and CSR in developing
countries (Moore and Spence 2006; Jamali et al. 2009; Prieto-Carron et al. 2006; Jeppesen and Lund-Thomsen 2010).
Given this paucity of research, our paper contributes to
existing studies that examine SMEs in ‘their own right’ and
acknowledges the less-formalized or informal way of carrying out CSR practices (Whalley 2000; Jenkins 2004). As
such, we focus on both formal and informal CSR practices
to gain a fuller understanding of what CSR means to SMEs
in a developing country context. Informed by the existing
literature, we examine formal practices (such as occupational safety and health, labor standards, working conditions, and environmental conditions). We also discuss
various forms of informal practices such as loans provided
by management to workers, the provision of extra holidays
or time off to take part in important family events such as
marriages and funerals, and contributions by the SME to
local community groups, churches and sport clubs. However, this study also examines the implications of informal
practices—which existed long before CSR was introduced
in Vietnam—of workers and managers. We ask: To what
extent are the informal practices consistent with the real
intent of CSR (as defined above)? And to what extent do
they perpetuate paternalism?
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We selected the textiles, garment, and footwear sector
for three reasons: (1) this sector is the largest wage-earning
sector in Vietnam, consisting of several thousand SMEs,
and thus it allows us to examine the implications of both
formal and informal practices; (2) this sector employs over
two million workers (mostly women) and gives us the
opportunity to showcase most-often invisible and rarely
heard voices of the workers and managers who manufacture apparel and shoes for the world, and (3) the sector
exemplifies the inner workings of four levels of the global
supply chains in a country that ranked seventh in total
world garment exports in 2011.
Understanding context is vital to understanding CSR
practices undertaken by SMEs in developing countries.
Thus, we contribute to the few studies that have focused on
‘‘Southern perspectives’’ (Jeppesen 2004; Tran 2011) by
including on-the-ground perspectives of workers, trade
unions and government officials in addition to owners and
managers.
Scott’s approach to institutional theory (Scott 1995/
2001) provides our overall analytical framework, and we
recognize a need for theoretically informed studies of
SMEs and CSR2 such as institutional theory for this endeavor (as mentioned in Jamali et al. (2009). Based on
Scott’s three-pillar framework, we explain (a) what relevant regulatory, normative and cognitive institutions exist
in Vietnam; (b) how Vietnamese managers in textile/garment/footwear (TGF) SMEs understand and practice CSR;
and (c) how workers in these SMEs understand and practice CSR.
The article is structured as follows. First, we critically
review the existing literature on SMEs and CSR and
establish a broad-based perspective on CSR that distinguishes between formal and informal CSR practices. Second, we apply Scott’s framework to the case of Vietnam,
outlining the three pillars, and discuss the methodological
framing of the study. Third, we present our findings. In this
section, we hear the voices of managers and workers
concerning the meaning of CSR and their real-life practices,3 this section is organized following Scott’s regulatory, cognitive and normative dimensions. We conclude
with a discussion of our findings and an assessment of the
contributions of the study before ending with some policy
recommendations.

2

See Jamali et al. (forthcoming), an editorial to the special issue on
SMEs and CSR in Developing Countries in Business and Society.
3
Please note that the missing articles and grammatical errors found
in the translations are because they are taken verbatim from shorthand responses of both managers and workers in the questionnaire,
which were then translated verbatim to English.

SMEs in their Own Right

Literature Review
Influenced by the mainstream CSR agenda (see above),
numerous sources discuss the business case for CSR in
SMEs and argue in favor of implementing formal CSR
practices in SMEs. We suggest, along with other scholars
who have expressed a critical view of the business case for
CSR, a need to address the lack of SME perspectives in the
literature. This includes the need to bring in the views of
workers and to reduce the knowledge gap regarding the
informal CSR practices that SMEs undertake (Jenkins
2004; Fox 2005; Murillo and Lozano 2006; Fassin 2008;
Jamali et al. 2009; Jeppesen et al. 2012).
The studies that have investigated CSR in SMEs have
concentrated on the ‘business case’ for SMEs as formal
practices in global supply chains, ensuring quality products
for end consumers, but not necessarily upholding labor
standards for workers Raynard and Forstater (2002), World
Bank (2003), Luetkenhorst (2004) and Luken and Stares
(2005). For instance, Raynard and Forstater discuss how
CSR can become relevant to SMEs in developing countries. They investigate the ‘business case’ for CSR in SMEs
and develop a framework for ‘small business responsibility’ with reference to quality management systems
(2002). Luetkenhorst states that ‘SMEs… need to be provided with the tools to monitor and report on their own
CSR performance and to continuously improve that performance’ (2004, p. 166).
Many scholars criticize SMEs for not engaging in CSR
and assume that they ‘should do CSR,’ specifying the
(formal) CSR practices that SMEs should undertake. Singh,
Kundu and Forstater (2005) argue that SMEs will gain
from CSR in respect to turnover, productivity and/or
number of clients. Luken and Stares (2005) suggest that the
SMEs should be motivated to carry out environmental and
social improvements because of the potential gains they
receive as suppliers to MNCs. Other authors show how
SMEs can be pressured or encouraged to adopt codes of
conduct, acquire CSR standard certifications, and/or produce CSR reports (Williamson et al. 2006; Kumari 2008).
The emphasis on formal CSR practices is questioned by
others. Fox stresses that ‘conventional drivers for CSR are
…likely to have relatively little or no relevance to SMEs’
(2005, p. 6).4 Fassin argues that the quest for the formalization of CSR practices in SMEs rests on misunderstandings and fallacies (2008).5 Jenkins finds that the
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theoretical approaches to CSR are biased toward ‘large
firms’ perspectives’ while assuming that SMEs are simply
‘smaller versions’ of large firms. Instead, she argues in
favor of viewing SMEs ‘in their own right’ when dealing
with CSR (Jenkins 2004). In fact, limited attention is paid
to how SMEs can afford to practice CSR. SMEs often
operate on low profit margins, so when ‘the business case
for CSR’ is absent or too difficult to achieve economically,
SME managers become reluctant to invest funds to meet
CSR standards (Skadegaard Thorsen and Jeppesen 2010).
Finally, it is important to pinpoint the unequal power relations among the relevant stakeholders in the context of
CSR (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006).
Vives (2006) investigates formal and informal CSR
practices in SMEs in different Latin-American countries.
He highlights a number of informal practices (providing
loans to employees, giving donations to local communities
and churches) and shows how cultural norms and values
influence CSR practices. As Vives points out, SME managers often are motivated to undertake CSR activities in
response to cultural and religious issues due to a sense of
personal or religiously inspired ethics concerning SMEs’
engagement in CSR (Vives 2006).6 Jeppesen (2004) provides another example of such an SME perspective from
small manufacturing firms in South Africa. Based on three
in-depth firm studies, he shows how a combination of what
is termed ‘firm-internal’ and ‘firm-external factors’ influence CSR practices. The firm-internal factors include the
resources and capabilities that SMEs can devote to CSR
practices and how the management–worker relations influence these practices. The firm-external factors include
the pressures on the SMEs to conduct CSR, whether
regulatory (from clients and government), normative (from
industry and history) or cultural (from traditions, norms
and values).
Most studies tend to derive the information from the
managers of MNCs without corroboration from the SMEs
(World Bank 2003; Blackman 2006a, b); only a few studies
examine CSR from the SME perspective, and they still do
not acknowledge the difficulties these businesses face
(Whalley 2000; Jenkins 2004; Skadegaard Thorsen and
Jeppesen 2010).
We argue that CSR needs to be investigated in a more
inclusive manner that centralizes on ‘Southern perspectives’ in order to overcome the bias in the literature. We
need to recognize significant interactions among the key
stakeholders within SMEs, including workers, labor unions

4

Instead, he points out that ‘there may be drivers based on a sense of
rootedness within a particular community … or other social and
cultural norms and experiences’ (Fox 2005, p. 6).
5
Among the fallacies, Fassin (2008) lists (a) CSR is worthless
without formalization, (b) SMEs do not report on CSR and hence do
not have CSR, and (c) that the CSR approach of large companies can
be used by SMEs (pp. 367–368).

6

The literature on SMEs and CSR has also highlighted the contextspecific nature of SMEs’ engagement in CSR, including the
community embeddedness of many CSR activities (Fox 2005; Fuller
and Tian 2006; Russo and Tencati 2009).
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and government officials, going beyond just managers/
owners (Jeppesen 2004; Tran 2011; Jeppesen et al. 2012).
Jeppesen argues the need to bring in insider perspectives—from owners, middle managers and workers—and
to highlight the similarities and differences in how CSR is
perceived within and among the different groups (Jeppesen
2004).7 In her study of CSR in Vietnam, Tran found that
the existing studies (on large and small firms) tend only to
present the perspectives of management and the state.
Thus, she argues for the need to involve workers in external
assessments of the impacts of CSR (Tran 2011). In a study
of 124 suppliers of the US and European garment and
footwear brands, Kim (2012) found that complementarity
between state and transnational private regulation, which
can supplement weak public law enforcement, introduces
labor laws into code enforcement and raises workers’
awareness of what management owes them and what rules
exist. While this study seems to focus on large factories,
our paper focuses on SMEs in the textiles, garments and
footwear (TGF) industries in order to shed light on various
combinations of state and private regulation and their effects on compliance with CSR as officially defined, and
what initiatives SME managers have implemented when
these official regulatory institutions have not covered such
topics. When we include different perspectives on CSR
from SMEs, we open up the possibility for a more in-depth
understanding of the dynamics within these firms.8
For an illustration of the flow in the investigation, see
Fig. 1 below.

Theoretical Framework
Institutional theory gives us an analytical tool to discuss how
different institutions affect SMEs and their practices in developing countries, as acknowledged by other scholars (Jamali et al. 2009). Of the three main strands of institutional
theory (comparative neo-institutionalism, new-economic
institutionalism and new organizational institutionalism),
we found new organizational institutionalism to be most
relevant because it allows us to analyze how individual actors—workers and managers/owners—interact both inside
7

Referring to this phenomenon, Whalley says that ‘many cultures
exist within SMEs’ (2000, p. 120).
8
This issue entails additional dimensions that we will not discuss in
this article. In particular, that existing contributions on SMEs and
CSR tend to present SMEs as a monolithic type of firm and/or as one
homogeneous unit or entity. The contributions often refer to SMEs as
if this very large group of firms had similar characteristics. However,
SMEs differ in size, type of activity undertaken, management style,
markets (Whalley 2000; Murillo and Lozano 2006) and choice of
CSR practices (Scott 2000; Vives 2006). Further assessment of the
differences between SMEs constitutes an important future research
area.
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an enterprise and outside in the communities, reflecting the
norms and belief systems that are practiced at the societal
level. On the other hand, the comparative neo-institutionalism (Willmott 2011; Hotho and Pedersen 2012) strand does
not add value to our study because it focuses on institutions at
a societal level, and the new-economic institutionalism
strand is concerned with conceptual development from a
rationalist, formalistic and quantitative perspective.
There are variations within the new-organizational institutionalism strand. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focus
on how institutional pressures affect the actions of organizations and individuals in these organizations and the
power of the actors involved.9 This perspective requires
interviews with the corporate buyers (or the clients/buyers
of SMEs), who are not the focus of our study. Laudal
(2010) presents an interesting application of this perspective of ‘global dissemination’ of CSR among SMEs. He
hypothesizes that ‘coercive isomorphism’ seems to be the
most important way of understanding the uptake of CSR
among SMEs. While we share Laudal and other scholars’
view that SMEs are likely to adopt CSR because they are
forced to do so by external pressures (from MNCs and
other actors) we argue that other internal factors are equally
important.
In contrast to these perspectives, we actually take ‘‘institutional pressures’’ (such as government policies or
corporate buyers’ regulations) as given and engage directly
with SME owners and workers to understand how they
respond to those pressures at the firm level. We do not
focus on the interplay between institutions and SME
strategies. As such, Scott’s framework (within the neworganizational institutionalism strand) helps us to explain
the behaviors and actions of SME labor and management,
in particular, to analyze their understandings of CSR and
their CSR practices (both formal and informal).
Scott provides a three-pillar structure to analyze the key
aspects of social institutions, defined as ‘social structures
that have gained a high degree of resilience,’ and how they
affect firms and their practices (2001, p. 48). The three
pillars are (1) ‘regulatory’ (laws, regulations, and government policies); (2) ‘normative’ (‘normative rules’ that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension
into social life’); and (3) ‘cognitive’ (‘the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the
frames through which meaning is made’) (Scott 2001, p. 57.
See also Amine and Staub 2009). This multi-level structure
9

Other perspectives such as those of Peng and others (Peng 2002,
2003; Amine and Staub 2009) focus on market-oriented institutional
transitions—formal and informal—and how they affect firm strategies
and decision-making. However, these perspectives are not relevant to
our case because we did not focus on the interplay between
institutions and firm strategies, nor did we seek to engage the formal
institutions by interviewing the representatives of such institutions.
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Context: historical, political, economic and social

Institutions

Societal
views:
government,
unions,
industry,
communities
and
consumers

Regulatory

SMEs

Managers
Workers
CSR practices

Normative

Formal:
* Working environment
* Physical environment

Cognitive

* Labor standards and working conditions

Informal:
* Informal arrangements

* Support to local communities

Fig. 1 Flow chart on process of investigating formal and informal CSR practises among managers and workers in TGF-SMEs in Vietnam

embraces history which is important to the analysis of socialist Vietnam transitioning from a command economy to a
market system fully integrated into the global capitalist
economy.
First, factors in the regulatory system can either encourage or discourage CSR practices through incentives or
disincentives—by way of providing or restricting access to
resources. Promulgating healthy and safety practices may
highlight the importance of certain standards in the working environment in SMEs, which can be supported by
stringent enforcement or undermined if limited or no enforcement takes place.
Factors in the normative system reflect societal belief
systems which reaffirm the expectations that one should
have decent working conditions, job security and benefits,
and a clean environment. We also note that ‘societal views’
should include the views of consumers, local communities,
unions etc.10 However, given the scope of this paper, we
chose to focus on the views of owners/managers and
workers only in the TGF enterprises. We have supplemented these views with formal and informal interviews
with representatives from the local unions and state
officials.
As for the regulatory pillar, we consider both government provision (such as social welfare, public health and
education) and private regulation (such as services and
benefits to employees). In cases of limited resources and
lack of willingness, the government tends to leave these
10

A stakeholder perspective would similarly include a range of
views of importance to the SME (see e.g. Freeman 1984). However,
the focus revolves around the firm (MNC) actions—the key
stakeholder—not the suppliers or the workers.

responsibilities to the companies, which are then expected
to provide them to employees. Moreover, if the state does
not enforce the regulation on labor standards, such as
minimum wages and health insurance, then the firms are
supposed to do so. But while large firms are assumed to
have the financial resources to set up a health clinic on the
factory premises, SMEs have far fewer resources to do so.
While Scott’s framework is relevant and useful for our
study, we acknowledge its limitations and suggest ways to
overcome them. First, in his discussion of the ‘normative
system,’ Scott presupposes a particular western political
economic system, which is different from the case of
Vietnam. Second, his perception of ‘societal views’ is
complex and broad, and thus difficult to establish in one
study. Therefore, we choose to focus on the views of key
stakeholders that are rarely heard, such as the SMEs’
owners/managers and workers, and to omit other stakeholders listed above, which might be included in subsequent studies. Third, recognizing the effects of unequal
power relations in the global supply chains, we add critical
perspective to Scott’s framework (2001) when applying it
to socialist Vietnam. In particular, we embed differential
power relations in the multi-tiered global supply chains,
and reveal the responsibility of large firms/MNCs toward
their first-tier suppliers, and (second and third-tier) subcontractors often invisible to the MNCs, as well as MNCs’
third-party auditors in the TGF industries.
As part of a normative formal system, MNCs, their firsttier supplier companies and their auditors, and industry
associations set the standards or codes of conduct - for
SMEs to follow. Training courses on the implementation of
codes of conduct can increase awareness of the issues that
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the codes address: leading management to insist on using
safety equipment and workers to realize the need to use it
(even if it causes discomfort) and to demand safe working
conditions. However, the code’s requirements often propel
the SMEs to spend money, such as to provide masks or
build more toilets for workers, which they cannot afford
even with incentives to comply.
The factors in the cognitive system, defined as ‘people’s
cognitive structures and social knowledge’ (Amine and
Staub 2009, p. 200) are often the individuals’ understanding and reasoning, which are influenced by both normative/belief systems and regulatory factors. Thus, there is an
interconnection among these three factors—cognitive,
normative and regulatory. So, a manager experiencing a
lack of government (public) enforcement and knowing that
competitors are not observing the law will be inclined to
think ‘Why should I do so?’ And when managers do not
follow stipulated practices, workers often think ‘Why
should we do so?’ as well. On the other hand, certain religious beliefs and cultural practices will influence managers to give contributions to the local community and
religious celebrations. In Vietnam, the ‘Tet bonus’ is an
additional, 13th month wage given to celebrate the Vietnamese Lunar New Year and to support the families of
migrant workers.

Vietnam’s Historical, Political and Economic Contexts
We selected Vietnam as a case study because it allows us to
examine how a transitional economy has influenced SME
practices and the impacts of CSR. As is well-known,
Vietnam has aspects of both socialist and capitalist systems. The 1989 disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the
collapse of the Eastern European market (Vietnam’s major
trading partners) led to a systemic shock for the Vietnamese economy with loss of trade, aid, loans, and commerce. Facing such difficulties, Vietnam opened itself to
other markets, especially Japan, Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union. Since
1989, the Vietnamese state has called itself a ‘‘market
economy with a socialist orientation’’ aiming to fulfill a
‘‘civilized and equitable’’ society. After several years of
adjusting to the new global situation, Vietnam formally
endorsed the market-based economy at its Party Congress
in 1992. Further global integration took place with the end
of the twenty-year US trade embargo in 1994, the US
diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1995, and Vietnam’s
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2007.
As found by Tran and Norlund (2014, pp. 16–17),
Vietnam has not yet abandoned socialism in terms of industrial policies and progressive labor laws, but it faces the
dilemma of a market-based economy: growth in trade and
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investment but limited value added to society. Vietnam
continues to supply mainly low-skilled, low-paid labor
force to the manufacturing sector in which SMEs are key
(Tran and Norlund 2014, pp. 9, 11). Situated in this historical context, Vietnam’s socialist legacy represents the
dilemmas faced by a developing country that still has to
respond to the workers who constantly remind the state and
their institutions to uphold the socialist vision and social
contract for their rights and entitlements (Tran 2013).
The Vietnamese state continues to enforce public
regulation, but the division of labor between the state and
the private sector is mixed.11 In the context of Vietnamese
market socialism, we found a combination of state and
quasi-state institutions that purport to regulate labor and
environmental conditions. This combined regulatory
structure has been entering into ‘‘environmental consultancy’’ service contracts with the MNCs who place orders
with these SMEs. As discussed in the Regulatory System in
the Vietnam Section, evidence shows that both SME
managers and workers are put under pressure to comply
with CSR codes of conduct and standards while most
MNCs refuse to share the costs with those SMEs under a
‘CSR heading.’12
In the context of ‘‘market economy with socialist orientation,’’ it is important to understand the function of the
Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), a
quasi-state business/management association, which is in
charge of implementing/mainstreaming CSR in Vietnam.
This sets the Vietnamese case apart from those of nonsocialist Asian countries such as Korea or Taiwan. Since
the Prime Minister Decision No. 123 in 2003, the VCCI is
the principal association that is supposed to represent
thousands of both foreign and domestic employers, including small and medium enterprises in the private sector,
as well as joint-stock company members that were
formerly state-owned enterprises. The VCCI is run mostly
by retired state officials or party members who have close
connections to the one-party government. In reality, VCCI
only represents its members, not the whole private sector as
stipulated by law. The VCCI does not have a nationwide
presence, nor can it control the budgets of its member
firms.13
11

With regard to the relevance of Rawls (2001) for Vietnam and the
study, please kindly review Appendix 2 for an extended discussion.
12
Similar to Rawls, Arnold and Hartman draw on Kant as they have
the following point on MNC managers and their respect for workers:
‘‘One core ethical obligation of MNC managers is to respect their
employees. To fully respect a person, one must actively treat his or
her humanity as an end, and not merely as a means to an end. This
means that it is impermissible to treat persons like disposable tools.
The Kantian basis for this claim is well established (Arnold and
Hartman 2006, p. 682).
13
Tran (2011), pp. 128–129; www.vcci.com.vn/sub/vbli/default.htm.
Aaccessed October 2014.

SMEs in their Own Right

In Vietnam, the concept of CSR has been introduced
from the top down by western governments and both national and global institutions (Tran 2011; Hamm 2012).
The World Bank, the US, the ILO and MNCs have pressured the Vietnamese government to participate in CSR
initiatives since 2002, and with increasing urgency between
2004 and 2006.14 In this context, the VCCI—not the
Vietnamese labor union or any other NGO—has been appointed to be the key organization to manage and oversee
CSR in Vietnam.15 VCCI has been working closely with
UNIDO on ‘‘CSR: Adapt, Adopt, Improve CSR in Vietnam’s SME’’ initiative, and they have been training CSR
consultants to mainstream CSR as a ‘‘business case’’.16
Reviewing the reports of UNIDO (2002 and 2006) shows
a mixed and incomplete picture of what VCCI has actually
accomplished. In the 2002 UNIDO report, there is only one
page dedicated to the case of Vietnam (Box 27: IBLF
Business Links Programme), which stated the goals of the
Vietnam Business Links Initiative (VBLI) to ensure healthy
and safe working environment for workers, especially on the
handling of chemicals, and measures to reduce noise, fumes
and dust. The VBLI is led by a management forum, including
the International Business Leaders Forum (run by sportswear
companies such as Nike, Pentland and Adidas), international
NGOs, the VCCI, the Viet Nam Leather and Footwear Association, and the Vietnam and British governments. While
the stated goals to improve the business environment in developing and transitional economies—such as Vietnam—
are consistent with CSR intent, there is no evidence or concrete example of how the VBLI supports local shoe
manufacturers to meet local environmental and health and
safety regulations as well as the MNC social and environmental purchasing criteria. In the 2006 UNIDO report (with
only 5 pages on the VBLI), while there has been some progress, there is still no labor representation on the steering and
management committee in this primarily footwear/garment
management forum and a lack of concrete details on the
effects of this model. Except for some general statistics on
the Management Support System and on the participation of
the pilot footwear factories (60 % of factories in the footwear
industry), there is no example, nor are there any voices from
the participating managers and workers.17
14

For example, the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs
(MOLISA) worked with the ILO to conduct several preliminary
studies of the impacts of CSR in Vietnam.
15
UNIDO: corporate social responsibility: implications for Small
and Medium Enterprises in Developing Countries; UNIDO, Vienna,
2002; UNIDO: SME Clusters and Responsible Competitiveness in
Developing Countries—AccountAbility with UNIDO, January 2006;
(Hamm 2012).
16
http://vccinews.com/news_detail.asp?news_id=27693; http://www.
csr-vietnam.eu/.
17
UNIDO 2006, pp. 45–49.
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The 2004 Action Aid Project on Raising Awareness on
Corporate Social Responsibility for Small and Medium
Size Enterprises in Cottage Industry focused on the responsibility of MNCs to the well-being of workers and the
environment. The project has investigated the employment,
the labor safety and working conditions in traditional (artisanal) villages in three provinces and cities in the North of
Vietnam, and provided concrete and realistic recommendations on causes of poor compliance to labor and environmental regulations in these trade villages. However, the
main focus is not on SMEs, but on the environmental and
health conditions of villagers in these provinces.
In a study focusing on multinationals (MNCs) and their
large suppliers, Tran (2011) found that CSR in Vietnam
was largely tokenistic and pursued primarily for the sake of
western MNCs, not of workers. The multilevel subcontracting nature of the global supply chain makes it very
difficult to monitor suppliers and their contract factories for
code compliance. Hence violations are rampant in supplier
factories, with MNCs shirking their responsibilities to
share the costs involved in the proper enforcement of CSR.
In turn, the Vietnamese government has also failed to
support CSR implementation in these large suppliers (Tran
2011), and there is no public CSR policy in Vietnam either
(Hamm 2012).

Methodology
Our methodological approach combines and integrates
exploratory with explanatory components. We draw on
sources with a ‘Critical CSR approach’ (Blowfield and
Frynas 2005; Prieto-Carron et al. 2006; Newell and Frynas
2007) for the exploratory part, and we use institutional
theory (Scott 1995/2001) for the explanatory part.
Our selection of the survey and interview questions reflected the exploratory and explanatory components, including sensitivity to the country-specific contexts and the
need to bring out voices of managers and workers. We
asked questions to understand not just the formal practices
of CSR, but also the informal practices initiated by the
managers/owners of these SMEs.18 From June to
18

Examples of crucial questions asked to managers and workers
include: (A) Do you/your firm monitor the usage of water, electricity
and input materials? (B) Are the occupational safety and health
procedures in your firm due to government regulation, formal certified
systems, codes of conduct or your own system or practices? (Similar
questions were asked regarding wages and labor standards), and
(C) Does your company e.g. provide loans to the employees/workers,
allow sick leave and/or absence to participate in funerals, family
events etc, organize musical/cultural performances, donate
book/magazines to companies and dormitories? See Appendix 1 for
further information on all the questions asked and Jeppesen et al.
(2012) for further information on the format of the questionnaires and
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December 2011, we interviewed managers and workers
from twenty SMEs in the TGF industrial sector in Vietnam.19 We conducted three rounds of data collection
among the twenty SMEs20 resulting in a total of 165 interviews of which forty were with management (two interviews per company) and 125 with workers—108 from
medium and 17 from small enterprises (see Table 1 below).21 The SMEs selected for interviews were all located
in Ho Chi Minh City and its surrounding rural districts,
localities with large industrial areas and a high concentration of SMEs in the TGF sector.
Logic of Sampling
We were able to collect a convenience sample, given the
many constraints, thus we admit that there are some biases
and we do not generalize our findings. The lack of availability of statistical information on the thousands of SMEs
in Vietnam prevented us from conducting a more rigorous
randomly selected sampling. However, even with this
convenience sample, we had taken great care to meet the
three criteria of size (small versus medium-size), markets
(domestic versus international markets), and location
(metropolitan versus non-metropolitan), and were able to
point out some important patterns discussed in the findings
sections. Overall, the constraints we faced were caused by
many difficulties of doing fieldwork in socialist Vietnam.
Footnote 18 continued
interview guidelines, and Sects. 2 and 4 in Jeppesen et al. (2012) for
the reasons for focusing on these issues.
19
Among the 20 SMEs, seven were small and 13 medium-size; 17
had international markets, while 3 sold domestically; and 10 were
based in the metro area, while 10 were based in non-metro areas
(Jeppesen et al. 2012).
20
See Appendix 1 and Jeppesen et al. (2012) Appendix 1 for further
details.
21
We were able to interview workers in 14 SMEs, and not in six
factories. The key reasons were not because the owners want to ‘hide’
their practices, but precisely because, as second-tier suppliers, they
were directly affected by the work pressure of manufacturing for
global supply chains with workers who wanted to work overtime to
make ends meet. The three medium factories did grant us management interviews and allowed us to interview their workers subsequently. But when we followed up on their promises, all three pleaded
‘urgent delivery schedules’ (to first-tier suppliers) for not allowing us
time to interview their workers. Also, we could not interview workers
in three TGF factories mainly due to the heavy work pressure of ontime deliveries and the piece-rate payment system. The interviews
with managers and workers were conducted face-to-face in Vietnamese by field assistants whose first language is Vietnamese. All
three questionnaires were translated into Vietnamese and verified by
Vietnamese native speakers to ensure relevance to Vietnamese
cultural contexts. In the data analysis phase, the information from
the questionnaires was a) typed into Word documents from in-depth
interviews (open-ended sections of the forms) and b) coded and typed
into SPSS from the quantitative sections (Likert-scale typed questions
and changes over time).
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First, we had to rely on the cooperation and willingness of
the SMEs—already stretched out with delivery schedules—so it is likely that the more compliant SMEs tend to
be more willing to participate. Second is about the reality
in socialist Vietnam: without proper connections to the
local labor unions and local government officials (in both
metro and non-metro areas) who work with these SMEs,
we cannot obtain approvals to conduct interviews with the
managers and the workers, whose voices are vital to our
study.
An initial target of 20 SMEs was expected to be manageable, though the process of identifying SMEs in the
TGF sector and securing their participation was very timeconsuming and more challenging than anticipated. Even
with a team of seasoned and well-connected researchers,
we had to make many phone calls to set up the initial
interviews and more phone calls for follow-up visits to
complete the surveys and in-depth interviews. The final
sample of 20 SMEs included seven small-size and 13
medium-size firms, employing from 5 to 240 employees
with an average of 67 persons per firm. 11 were located in
the urban, industrial areas of Ho Chi Minh city (termed’metro’), while 9 or just less than half were located
outside the metropolitan area (termed ‘non-metro’). The
vast majority of firms had been in existence for 6 years or
more, while the age of the firms ranged from one to
25 years (see Table 2 below).

Empirical Findings
The key empirical findings can provide the big picture
before moving to the analysis of the three institutional
theory pillars (regulatory, cognitive and normative).
Seventeen of the interviewed Vietnamese SMEs
manufacture for foreign suppliers in global supply chains;
only three companies produced for the domestic market.
A high reduction in employment among SMEs with
little growth during 2011 indicates the lingering effects of
the global financial crisis on socialist Vietnam, after it fully
engaged in the global market system. The growth picture is
ambiguous: half of the interviewed textile and clothing
SMEs experienced growths in sales, while about a third had
seen decline. However, the reduction in employment is
clear: close to half the SMEs reduced their number of
employees, only a quarter reported increases, and another
quarter stated no change (see Table 3 above).
This reduction in hiring suggests two problems. First,
these SMEs have been exposed to the global economy. The
Vietnamese SMEs, in the bottom rung, can subcontract for
either what we term ‘East Asian intermediaries’ (mostly
large firms, primarily from Taiwan and South Korea) or
directly to ‘‘end buyers/MNCs.’’ The onset of the
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Table 1 Number of interviewed SMEs and number of interviews
according to category
Categories

Numbers

Total number of SMEs

20

Interviews with management (in-depth)

20

Interviews with management (survey questions
focused on changes in the last five years)
Interviews with workers (in-depth)

20

Total number of interviews (managers and
workers)

165

125 workers
(in 14 SMEs)

The Meaning of the Regulatory System in Vietnam

Source: Jeppesen et al. (2012)
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on the 20 interviewed SME in the TGF
sector in Vietnam
Size

7 small

13 medium-size

Employees (spread
and average)

5–240

67

Location (metro or
non-metro)

11 metro

9 non-metro

Years of
Establishment

From one to about 25 years

85 % were
6 years or
older

Market

3 local

17
local ? export

Turnover (range
and average)

From about 10.000 USD to
above 700.000 USD

103.000 USD

Ownership

73 % owned by single person or family

Source Jeppesen et al. (2012)
All SMEs were located in or around Ho Chi Minh City (former
Saigon) in the Southern part of Vietnam

worldwide financial crisis at the end of 2008 began to
impact Vietnam tremendously in 2009, especially the export-oriented TGF factories, due to the lower demand from
Europe, the USA and East Asian countries. However, these
linkages to the international market do not mean that these
SME managers receive support from their foreign suppliers
or MNCs to pursue formal CSR practices.22 Second, there
is a long-term structural problem of labor fluctuation: migrant workers search around the city for jobs with perceived higher wages and/or better benefits (such as social,
health, and unemployment insurance). According to
workers’ interviews, the main reason for them to move
around in search of higher wages is the lack of a living
wage (exacerbated by crippling inflation) and the lack of
social, health, or unemployment benefits. They thought that
higher wages could be found elsewhere, but interviews
with managers revealed this to be a pipe dream because of
22

the existence of a regional equilibrium average wage for
low-skilled workers; workers are therefore not likely to get
higher wages by moving around the city. This has led to the
labor fluctuations lamented by many managers, and it
provided an important context for understanding worker–
owner relations at the cognitive and normative levels. But,
first we will address what types of regulatory regimes exist
in Vietnam and how they affected CSR practices according
to both managers and workers.

More discussion on local initiatives to help themselves will be
discussed in the Cognitive and Normative sections below.

The regulatory system revolves around compliance, its
legitimacy, mechanisms and indicators (Scott 1995,
pp. 34ff). With ‘expedience’ as the basis of compliance, the
regulatory system’s mechanism is often of a coercive nature, with rules and laws, the foundation for their legitimacy being that they are legally sanctioned (Scott 1995,
pp. 35ff). The regulatory pillar consists of three key actors:
governmental agencies, corporate buyers, and the supplier
companies. We consider the regulation of corporate buyers
and their first-tier suppliers to be private, and the Vietnamese state’s mandatory regulation as public. In Vietnam,
there are three levels of regulation which affect the practices of managers/owners and workers: the private
(transnational), state (or public), and company/factory
levels.
First, on private regulation: 85 % of the 20 textile/garment/footwear factories we interviewed manufacture for
export.23 The majority (14 out of 17) of SMEs reported
having to comply with many forms of transnational private
buyers’ regulation.
As second-tier suppliers in the bottom rung who are
subcontracting for larger suppliers (see the Empirical
Findings section), many SMEs have to comply with several
buyers’ standards and regulations because they often take
orders from many corporate buyers or East Asian
intermediaries.
Overall, the reaction of SME managers to this type of
private regulation is expedient and compliant in order to
export their products. As one manager in a medium-size
garment firm expressed it: ‘… we are required to implement CSR. If we do not, we would have to close our
business.’ But East Asian intermediaries do not share the
costs, and the end buyers or MNCs turn a blind eye to
manufacturing at this lowest rung of the global supply
chain. Thus, the factories themselves have to pay for these
inspections in order to be able to export their assembled
products. The situation can become untenable when the
23

The six factories that did not state any private buyers’ regulation
include four small and two medium factories.
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Table 3 Development in sales and employment among interviewed
SMEs in the textile, garment, and footwear (TGF) industries in
Vietnam
Sales/
employment
Type of
development

Development in
sales (n = 20) (%)

Development in no. of
employees (n = 20) (%)

Growth

50

27

Stable

17

28

Decrease

33

45

Source Jeppesen et al. (2012)

East Asian intermediaries and corporate buyers or MNCs
require certification of different codes of conduct, which
can be very costly for SMEs to comply with.24 Management at a medium-size factory making leather purses and
gloves explained: ‘Funds are needed to carry out these
[CSR] responsibilities. Due to the fact that this is our
company’s responsibility, we cannot ignore this CSR cost,
but have to include it in the final price of our products.’ In
other words, by absorbing this cost, they lose their price
competitiveness compared to other factories that spend
nothing on CSR.
Sometimes, the buyers pay for and send in third-party
global monitors or auditors (such as Intertek, SGS or FLA
with branches in Vietnam) to carry out factory inspections;
sometimes the buyers themselves (such as the Japanese
consumers’ association) come down to the factories to inspect. What they inspect is a mixed bag. Our findings show
that this type of regulation focuses primarily on ensuring
that the quality, safety, and performance of the manufactured products meet the relevant standards of the end
consumers (in the developed, importing countries), not the
labor standards of the workers who have manufactured
those very products. For instance, the final products of one
medium-size garments factory must meet the Eco Tex
standards25, otherwise it cannot export to the EU. At a
medium shoe factory, one representative emphasized that
‘we must follow what our buyers regulate; otherwise, we
cannot export our shoes.’ In this case, SGS was the
transnational auditor. On their website, entitled SGS in
Vietnam, this company advertises its services (inspection,
testing, certifications, and verification) to ‘reduce risk and
improve productivity’ for its customers (the corporate
buyers), but it never once mentions labor or workers.26 One
24

Skadegaard Thorsen and Jeppesen (2010), deal in depth with the
many challenges that this phenomenon, sometimes called ‘code
mania’, represent for local suppliers, including SMEs. As the same
authors point out, this also leads to the exclusion of SMEs from the
value chains.
25
For more information on the standard, see: http://live-in-green.
com/products/bedding/eco-tex.html.
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representative at another medium-size garment factory
said: ‘Foreign buyers from Hong Kong27 often come to the
factory to assess the quality of the working environment.
Otherwise, foreign buyers hired global auditing companies
based in Vietnam with mainly Vietnamese employees. For
instance, Intertek did come to audit our factory.’ A closer
look at Intertek shows that its main focus is to ‘evaluate the
quality and qualifications of products’ and ‘suppliers’ capability.’ Nowhere on their website were the words
‘workers, working conditions’ or ‘labor standards’
mentioned.28
Occasionally, private regulation can bring about some
positive effects for workers, especially on work safety issues. For instance, the popular Japanese ‘5 S’ system (including screening, organizing, cleanliness/hygiene, caring
and readiness),29 which is required in any factory that
assembles products to be exported to Japan, can improve
work safety for workers. A representative from a mediumsize kimono factory said: ‘The Japanese consumer association first sent their representatives to visit and inspect
our factory, returned to Japan to report the findings to their
members, then after [everyone] was satisfied [with what
they witnessed on the factory floor], they signed the contract with us.’ Other common work-safety issues include
adequate factory space and an appropriate number and
cleanliness of restrooms for workers. In a medium garment
factory, one union representative said: ‘[in the past] due to
our factory facility not meeting the buyer’s standards
(80 % export to the USA), we lost the direct contract
signed with that buyer and ended up subcontracting (being
in the bottom-rung) for another buyer. But, in the near
future, our company is building a factory occupying over
2000 m2, and (when it is ready) we will transfer all of our
workers to the new facility. Then, the conditions will be
more positive (to regain the direct contract signed with the
first buyer).’ Of course, while these examples are not
representative and the buyer factor can definitely play a
role (with the USA and Japanese being represented here),
they show the potential for the positive influence of private
regulation on improving factory facilities and work safety,
a win–win situation for both labor and management.
Second, state regulation exists in a mixed structure,
encompassing both state and quasi-state agencies, and it
focuses primarily on environmental standards and the
working environment, not on working conditions. Overall,
this combined structure charges two types of fees: state
26

http://www.sgs.vn/en/Our-Company/About-SGS/SGS-in-Brief/
SGS-in-Vietnam.aspx, accessed 12 June 2013.
27
What we call ‘East Asian intermediaries’ in this article.
28
http://www.intertek.com/news/2010/11-16-audit-services-alibaba/.
29

This means: Screening (Sàng Loc), Organizing (S p X p), Clean˙
liness/Hygiene (S ch Sẽ), Caring (Săn Sóc), Readiness (S n Sàng).
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management fees (from the state sector: the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment, DONRE), and service
fees (from the quasi-state agency: Institute of Water, Resources, Environment, Technology, IWRETE).30 DONRE
is a government environmental entity which has jurisdiction over both city/province and district levels; it manages
natural resources (including land, water, minerals, and
marine resources) and the environment of the administrative location in which it resides.31 DONRE charges management fees to monitor SME compliance with state
environmental laws by visiting factories and filing reports.
On the other hand, IWRETE, an environmental consultancy, charges service fees as stipulated on the contracts
signed with foreign buyers (MNCs who place orders with
SMEs), or with SMEs directly, or even in contracts signed
with a government entity.32 As such, IWRETE service fees
vary and depend on the scope, scale, and complexities of
what need to be monitored at the SME premises (such as
toxic materials, waste water, dust, or noise).
Six out of twenty (30 %) TGF factories reported obstacles that are related to state regulations on environmental issues and the costs associated with compliance
with state regulations. These problems range from unclear
state instructions to time-consuming paperwork requirements to inconsistent state regulation. For instance, an
owner of a medium-size garment factory complained that
‘We are building an environmental project according to the
request of Ho Chi Minh City DONRE. The monitoring
report is done once every six months. This is a costly endeavor because we do not completely understand the instructions and have to hire other [consultancy] services (at
about eight million VND).’ The garment factory owner
then suggested that DONRE should provide consistent state
instructions and recommendations to different service
agencies. Another manager from a medium-size garment
factory complained: ‘It is time consuming to produce environmental reports for official agencies.’ Other managers
complained about the lack of consistent government enforcement, leading to compliant companies being at a
disadvantage compared to those which did not comply as
phrased by one manager of a medium-size garment factory:
‘At the moment, our company spends an annual amount of
30

Correspondence with Dr Huynh thi Ngoc Tuyet and Ms Nguyen
Minh Chau, September 2–7, 2013. Also, in http://www.ust.vn/trade_
detail.asp?trade=10585andcat=19andp=95 (Accessed September 8,
2013).
31
The city people’s committees govern DONRE administratively,
and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment directs and
supervises DONRE technically.
32
IWRETE is Vi n K thu t Tài Nguyên N c và Môi Tr ng in
Vietnamese. It is an environmental consultancy institute that belongs
to the Vietnamese Science and Technology Association (VUSTA or
Liên Hi p H i Khoa Hoc and K Thu t in Vietnamese).
˙
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four billion VND on chemicals used for processing [or
treating] waste, while many other companies do not do this.
If that four billion VND is not spent on waste treatment
chemicals, then it can be used for other things such as
expanding production. At the same time, we have to keep
our product prices the same as those of other companies!
If these costs are not shared by the corporate buyers or
first-tier East Asian suppliers, then SMEs have to absorb
them in order to receive the garment or footwear contracts,
in addition to the costs of treating waste materials themselves. Some complained about the lack of funding for
being compliant. For instance, the owner of CT garment, a
medium-size garment factory, lamented: ‘The waste water
treatment system is expensive. It costs about 300 million
VND (about US $15,000), and it is installed once and for
all… During inspection, the government can impose a fine
of up to 500 million VND.’ A manager from another
medium-size garment factory concurred: ‘Funds are required to carry out these responsibilities,’ and accordingly
the SMEs have to add these costs of CSR to their product
prices. In short, the proliferation of state and quasi-state
regulations can be a cost to SMEs with ambiguous results.
State regulation on labor standards also has many
shortcomings. Overall, few labor inspectors go to factories
to monitor labor standards as stipulated in the Labor Code,
this being consistent with a finding by Kim (2012).33 Seven
out of twenty (35 %) TGF factories reported obstacles related to state regulation of labor standards, ranging from
often cited concerns such as stable wages, a proper working
environment and social and unemployment insurance, to
some lesser-known issues such as income tax policy and
residence permits for migrant workers. For instance, a
manager in a medium-size garment factory suggested that
the income threshold for income tax should be raised: ‘The
minimum wage level that is subjected to income tax should
increase. Right now, you have to pay income tax for a wage
of four million VND (per month), but this wage level is not
enough to cover all living expenses, and is not much.’ In
another medium-size garment factory, the manager brought
up a major concern of migrant workers, namely that the
majority of them are working in factories manufacturing
for export where: ‘Migrant workers with temporary resident certification will receive a housing subsidy of VND
300,000, and 200,000/month without certification.’ While
these amounts were small, they were critical to these poor
workers’ survival. Also, several small factories complained
about the lack of government attention to their needs. For
instance, the manager of a small shoe factory/workshop
33

Her interview with a VGCL official shows that there were only
four or five inspectors in Ho Chi Minh City to monitor nearly 40,000
enterprises that have been established there since 2000 (Kim 2012,
p. 288).

123

600

suggested: ‘Social insurance specialists can provide us with
clear explanations so that we can relay this information to
workers when they inquire about social and unemployment
insurance.’ In a small garment factory, the manager said:
‘We are on our own; since this is a small company; we
have not received any attention from the local
government.’
Third, company and factory regulation is very popular
among the SMEs. Regardless of the existence of either
state or global private regulation, most factories we interviewed have their own regulations. Surprisingly, almost
70 % of the workers we interviewed reported seeing
company or factory regulations posted in the factory
premises, though they understood them as codes of conduct. We will provide concrete evidence of this in the
cognitive section, but overall most interviewed workers
believed that CSR is a set of regulations that tells them
what to do and what to avoid on the factory floor. Only a
handful of workers understood that it is about the responsibility of employers, not themselves, to improve labor
standards and their working conditions.
But how do managers and workers understand CSR?
And how do the cognitive institutions affect their understanding and expectations?

The Meaning of the Cognitive System in Vietnam
First, we start with empirical findings on managers’
knowledge of the term CSR and their understanding of
social responsibilities. Second, we bring in workers’ perspectives on CSR and their expectations. Third, we compare and contrast the cognitive schemas of managers and
workers.
As shown in Table 4, about 60 % of Vietnamese managers in SMEs stated that they are aware of and know the
CSR concept. Interestingly, when asked about their companies’ responsibilities, all interviewed managers/owners
felt responsible for labor standards, working conditions,
and working environment, and 90 % for the physical environment.34 While 40 % of managers were unaware of the
concept of CSR, (almost) all recognized the responsibilities
that we here equate with ‘CSR’ (see the four-dimensional
approach above).
Yet again, only 35 % of managers stated that these firms
had implemented codes of conduct or certified management systems, and only 30 % prepared CSR reports
(Jeppesen et al. 2012). There are two explanations for these
low figures compared to the perception of responsibilities.

34

Most do not receive support from MNCs or suppliers to engage in
formal CSR practices, as explained earlier.
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First, MNC buyers may choose to turn a blind eye to their
SMEs’ existence so the MNCs do not have to enforce
compliance. Second, most SMEs have very small profit
margin, and thus cannot afford to comply even if they are
aware of CSR.
Beyond the figures, however, qualitative evidence
shows that many are very conscious of and have complied
with some standards or ‘corporate buyer’s demands’ in
order to be able to export. For instance, one manager from
a medium-size company said that their orders must meet
the Eco Tex standard for the EU market, otherwise they
cannot export. Another manager expressed this necessity as
follows: ‘CSR means whatever the buyers impose; if we
don’t comply, we can’t export the products that we
assembled/manufactured.’
Second, since most foreign suppliers and MNCs supply
their own fabrics and accessories and also demand consistent quality standards and on-time delivery (critical
conditions for profit maximization), they have no need to
require codes of conduct compliance. Many Vietnamese
SME managers complained that the foreign suppliers and
MNCs put pressure on them to keep prices stable, even
when input costs go up, at the expense of the workers: ‘If
the raw material prices increase, our customers (the MNCs)
will pay for it, but they do not raise subcontract price for
our workers. The reason is that they provide the raw materials, so they are willing to raise prices for their own
products, but not for workers’ wages’ (a manager from a
medium-size garment firm).
However, such low statistics on formal compliance with
codes of conduct do not mean that managers do not care
about labor standards and working conditions or environments. Viewed through a stakeholder perspective, we found
that SMEs’ owners have broad concerns for many stakeholders. Over 60 % of the managers we interviewed stated
that their main responsibility is to be a ‘corporate citizen,’
while only half stated that ‘profit’ is the main responsibility
of the firm (Jeppesen et al. 2012). More than nine out of ten
considered ‘customers’ (corporate buyers) and ‘workers’ to
be the most influential stakeholders. The owner of a small
leather factory said: ‘Because they (the workers) determine
the quality of our products.’ Another garment-factory owner
said: ‘If workers are careful and produce good-quality
products that receive no complaints from our partners (customers/buyers), the company will not be negatively affected.’ We found that most managers place a high value on
stable employment and recognize the relationship between
workers’ skills and product quality, especially in firms that
produce for export. Moreover, given the labor fluctuations
explained in the basic empirical findings section, many
managers understand the significance of workers for their
enterprises’ commercial viability and on-time delivery to be
vital for subcontracting work.
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Table 4 Knowledge of CSR and perception of responsibilities of SMEs among interviewed managers in the TGF industry in Vietnam
Topic
respondent

Know
‘CSR’ (%)

Responsible for physical
environment (%)

Responsible for labor standards
and working conditions (%)

Responsible for working
environment (OSH) (%)

Managers

60

90

100

100

Source Jeppesen et al. (2012)

Many were conscious of the significance of a living
wage and decent working conditions, coming up with initiatives and informal practices to assist workers. For instance, most provide ‘wage advancement’ in the form of
small loans. In six SMEs, of which four manufactured for
export and two for the domestic market, the working atmosphere was often described as ‘like families,’ in which
most owners expressed personal awareness of their responsibilities toward their workers, the surrounding communities and the environment. These norms have been
practiced by the locals long before the introduction of CSR
to Vietnam. If we respect the ‘‘southern context,’’ then we
need to consider these die-hard cultural practices in their
own terms/rights. So, in spite of the spread of global
capitalism, not all practices become homogenized in the
name of ‘‘CSR practices,’’ but they exist in their own right.
Turning to workers’ perspectives, while most workers
did not understand the formal definition of CSR, the majority was conscious of and expected to receive proper
labor standards which overlap with managers’ cognition
discussed above. Surprisingly, the majority of interviewed
workers interpreted CSR as a set of factory regulations
with which to comply—such as working hard and following the rules—not employers’ responsibility to improve
labor standards and working conditions. In other words, the
workers evaluate themselves based on how they meet the
standards set by management, instead of evaluating how
management implements and enforces labor standards and
working conditions. So, on the question ‘Whether they are
satisfied with the code of conduct,’ one needs to interpret
these statistical findings as workers’ satisfaction with
‘company regulations,’ not codes of conduct. In particular,
when nearly eight out of ten workers said ‘satisfied,’35 we
need to interpret that as the majority of the interviewed
workers being satisfied with their compliance with company regulations.
There are several interpretations of this misunderstanding. First, it could be a win–win situation: workers’ intuition to comply with safe working environment for mutual
benefits with management and to make the company a

better place to work. Second, most company regulations
are about health and work-safety stipulations, not about
labor standards. For example, the 5S system (introduced in
many Japanese-owned factories), a part of the Lean
Manufacturing system, is a five-phase methodical way to
organize work practices: Sort, Straighten, Sweep, Standardize, and Sustain. While these practices can benefit
workers in terms of a safe workplace, they are not about
corporate responsibilities to workers such as decent wages
and benefits.
Very few workers correctly mentioned employers’ responsibilities toward them (as intended by CSR). Only
about one out of thirty mentioned that the company had a
code of conduct and needed to ‘inspect code of conduct’
for workers’ benefits. One female worker in a medium-size
garment factory said: ‘It is to the workers’ benefit that the
code of conduct and company regulations be inspected.’ A
male worker from a small garment factory said: ‘I don’t
know if there are any regulations. Seemingly there is no
code of conduct.’ Few recognized the absence of employers’ responsibility to improve labor standards and
working conditions. Another male worker from a small
garment firm sharply pointed out: ‘Regulations require
punctuality, good maintenance of machines, no shouting.
Sick leave should be approved before being taken. There
are benefits for old-timers and seniors. Workers are required to attend monthly meetings. Employer’s responsibility is not mentioned (authors’ emphasis).
Workers clearly articulated their concerns about labor
standards and working conditions as key parts of CSR.
They are mostly concerned with stable and livable incomes
with job security, proper benefits, and allowances. In particular, the median wage of 125 TGF workers is about 3
million VND (about US $144 at the time of writing). While
this level is higher than the government-stipulated minimum wage, it is still not a liveable wage in Vietnam.36
When asked ‘what would be a liveable wage,’ both female
and male workers responded that it would be around 4

36

35

About one in six said ‘neutral,’ and very few were unsatisfied.

The median wage is the same for both female and male TGF
workers. We have used the exchange rate of 1 USD = 20,794.00
VND as of 15 March 2012. At the time of writing, the governmentstipulated monthly minimum wage is 2 million VND in Ho Chi Minh
City and 1.78 million VND in non-metropolitan areas (Tran 2007).
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million VND, which is considerably higher than the median take-home wage.
Most workers are concerned about the basic labor
standard issues: pay and benefits. For instance, a female
worker in a medium-size garment company said: ‘Guaranteed basic pay,’ while another female worker stated; ‘Get
paid regularly on the 12th, advance pay on the 25th.’ Yet
another female worker expressed: ‘I feel safe thanks to the
social, health and unemployment insurance,’ while a male
worker said; ‘Pleasant work. High and stable salary.’
But non-wage concerns are also important. A male
worker in a medium-size textile company expressed: ‘Job
security. Flexible hours. Allowances for responsibilities
and perfect attendance are helpful for our living conditions’
and a female worker said: ‘Company loans available; free
meals; doctor’s bills are paid by company.’ Workers expressed the needs for good working relations with their
owners/managers and co-workers, as well as genderspecific rest breaks, and time flexibility (especially significant for young migrant workers). They praised the
conditions when they were treated with respect by their
employers and enjoyed harmonious working relations with
their fellow workers. Among the examples were the following quotes. A female worker from a medium-size garment company stated: ‘What is most important is the close
relationship between the owner and the workers; the
owner’s concern about workers’ well-being.’ A female
worker from another medium-size garment company expressed that ‘The owner treats me in a kind and caring way.
Friendly environment.’ Similar observations were stated by
a female work in a medium-size textile company: ‘Pleasant
working atmosphere. Co-workers are like brothers and
sisters in the same family.’ A final example is a female
worker in another medium-size garment company, who
expressed her appreciation: ‘‘There is always freedom here.
Workers are allowed to talk at work.’
In contrast to these (positive) statements, the workers
spoke up when they were not being treated with respect. A
male worker in a small garment company stated as follows:
‘The manager is very rude. He shouts at workers at any
time, using very rough words. The workers who learn
Korean recognize these rough words.’ Many female
workers quoted the following stipulations for women
mentioned in the Labor Code (such as paid breaks at work
during menstruation cycles and pregnancy) as well as with
the words of a female worker from a medium-size garment
company: ‘Insurance, Tet bonus and special policy for
female workers.’ While another female worker mentioned;
‘Free lunch. Social, health, unemployment insurance…
Special policy for female workers.’
Interestingly, having time flexibility is one of the most
often-cited reasons by both female and male workers for
them to remain with a company. As most workers are
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young and many are migrants, they have family obligations
and need more education, so it is important as highlighted
by a male worker from a small garment company to have
‘Permission to take time off for family matters’: Or, as
stated by another male worker from a small shoe company,
it is positive to have ‘Flexible hours; Good relationship
between owner and workers.’ A female worker in a
medium-size garment company expressed that ‘Permission
to take time off is the most important factor because I am a
student and am doing part-time job’; while a male worker
in a medium garment factory said: ‘Late arrivals at work
are tolerated. In other companies, late workers would be
reprimanded.’
But what drives these intertwining cognitions of labor
and management in the context of Vietnam?

The Meaning of Normative Systems in Vietnam
The ‘‘market economy with socialist orientation’’ in oncesocialist Vietnam, provides a context for workers’ expectations of the socialist contract—or a sense of entitlements
that workers used to have under the socialist regime such as
job security and good benefits. At the cultural level,
workers also expected to be treated with respect and
kindness and be given flexibility, even when the pay was
not high.
We found evidence that most managers/owners in these
SMEs were reminded of, and thus responded to, these
workers’ expectations, at times with compassion toward
their workers’ needs. But there is another explanation for
management’s accommodation: the need to have a reliable
workforce for their businesses to survive in a tight labor
market. As such, the Vietnamese SME managers in this
mixed system (market socialism) may have behaved with
profit-maximizing behavior, similar to those in the market
system with economic concerns—such as costs, wages, and
job security.
All the interviewed managers expressed awareness of
and engaged in informal cultural practices. Most factories—small or medium—uphold cultural practices that date
back to the socialist era (before the market reforms of the
late 1980s), including the 13th month’s pay (or bonus) for
the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, days-off for cultural
events and holidays, short-term leaves for sickness and
family affairs (such as weddings and funerals), small loans
or advances for workers, donations (money and in-kind
contributions to local communities and organizations), and
cultural events and celebrations for worker entertainment
(newspapers, sports events, musical entertainment, cable
TV, and access to the internet). A manager at a mediumsize garment company said: ‘Whenever migrant workers
from the south [i.e., provinces to the south of Ho Chi Minh
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City] have funerals, weddings, or death anniversaries, we
have to allow them to go back to their home towns/villages.’ Another manager at a small garment company
confirmed: ‘Workers still receive payment for their days
off to attend to family affairs such as funerals and weddings, unless they take days off without permission.’ A
small textile owner said: ‘We have the Tet (Vietnamese
Lunar New Year) bonus.’
Some managers clearly recognized the importance of
different religious, regional, racial, and ethnic practices:
‘Some are Buddhists, some are Catholics, and these things
have some influence’ (a manager from a medium-size
garment company). In some multi-ethnic companies, mutual assistance does exist: ‘The company’s workers include
both Vietnamese and [ethnic] Chinese. The working environment has family-like elements. There are Chinese
traditional and cultural practices which treat employees
like family members. Mutual assistance does exist’ (a
manager from a medium-size garment company).
From the workers’ perspective, most interviewed
workers had expected to receive entitlements such as job
security, stable and livable pay, and respect as part of the
legacy of socialist Vietnam. They appreciated it when
management allowed flexible working hours, especially
important for working mothers, and there was a respectful
atmosphere at work. Also, workers at this particular
medium-size garment company appreciated the understanding of the owner, who himself had moved up from the
rank-and-file. A manager at this factory shared this about
her boss: ‘The factory owner was a worker himself for
twenty years, so he very much understands and empathizes
[with workers]. He [the company owner] realizes that if
management treats workers well, then they will work hard
in return.’
Moreover, we need to bring in the effects of the norms
of transnational private regulation by way of ‘buyers’ or
third-party auditors mostly checking medium-size (not
small) factories that manufacture for export. The effects are
mixed. On the one hand, we found that most of these
regulations tend to focus on the quality and safety of the
products for the end consumers in developed countries, not
necessarily for workers and their conditions, as discussed
earlier. For the companies that have to comply with these
standards, most owners had to absorb the costs, as in this
case: ‘When faced with very strict buyers’ auditing of our
final products, we had to spend some money to make sure
that our products are up to their [quality] standards’ (the
female head of personnel department/accountant/union in a
medium-size garment company). On the other hand, as
discussed above, the norms and standards of private buyers’ regulations can benefit both labor and management.
There may be an overlap in ensuring both product quality
and decent and safe working conditions.
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Discussion
On the one hand, Scott’s three-pillar framework provides
an analytical lens to conduct a bottom-up analysis of the
meaning of CSR to both workers and managers and to
interpret the case of Vietnam. On the other hand, Scott’s
framework lacks power relations analysis, which is crucial
to SMEs at the bottom rung of the global supply chains for
the textile and garment industries. However, we have
overcome this weakness by relying on the insights
emanating from on-the-ground voices of SME owners and
workers.
First, with regard to improving labor standards, we
found an intimate connection between norms and cognition on the part of both Vietnamese managers and workers.
Managers are accommodating to workers for two reasons:
they respond, first, to workers’ social contract (or socialist
normativity) and cultural expectations and, second, to the
tightness of the labor market. Pay-day advances ensure that
migrant workers have to stay at least through one more pay
cycle, and small concessions (letting employees talk while
working, etc.) may be a way of keeping workers from
leaving in search of a better work situation. On the other
hand, many workers negotiate directly with their SME
bosses on non-wage issues such as flexible working hours,
sick leave, time off for family matters, and the 13th-month
bonus. These benefits are very important labor-standard
issues that are especially significant when workers’ official
salaries do not reach a standard for a living wage, making
overtime a necessity.
The use of ‘‘informal practices’’ gives us a way to react
to the mainstream CSR understanding, yet be able to respect cultural practices in Vietnam that existed long before
the introduction of western CSR initiatives to Vietnam in
the early 2000s. So, in terms of informal practices, managers and workers share long-lasting cultural norms, expectations, and socialist practices, and expect proper
implementation of the Labor Code and to treat each other
properly (See Table 5: Summary of Findings). In the
Vietnamese cultural context, for instance, most workers
would expect to receive a lump-sum Tet bonus (often in the
amount of one month of salary, aptly called ‘the 13thmonth salary’) and short-term leave for important family
obligations (such as weddings and funerals). These expectations are articulated and reinforced by the normative
system and lead managers to undertake such practices.
The divergence in the understanding of owners/managers and workers on the meaning of CSR has mixed effects. While this could be interpreted as workers’ intuition
to comply with safe working environment for their own
benefits, corporations need to be held accountable for their
responsibilities to workers such as decent wages and
benefits.
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Table 5 Summary of findings of CSR practices from perspectives of workers and managers/owners

Workers

Regulatory (public and private)

Cognitive (shared conceptions and
social knowledge)

Normative (formal codes, industry
standards, societal views of CSR, cultural
practices)

Many (60 %) recognize labor inspection is
lacking

Few (10 %) understand the formal
definition of CSR

Many recognize more rigorous environmental
(and food safety) regulation than labor
regulation

Most (80 %) interpreted company
regulations as codes of conduct
(CoC)

Cultural practices (13th month bonus,
patriarchal relations especially in small
shops)

Many did not wear masks, even when they are
issued, due to hot, poorly ventilated
conditions

Most expected rights/benefits from
Labor Code

Socialist expectations (job security and
stability)
Labor Code expectations (labor standards)

Workers’ requests:
Flexible working hours
Livable wage, not minimum wage
Good working relations with
owners/managers

Managers/
owners

State and quasi-state play key role in
environmental regulation
Transnational private regulation
Many complained about high certification fees
and inspection fees
Time-consuming reports
No assistance from first-tier suppliers or the
government for certification and compliance

Most (90 %) understand unequal
power relations in the global supply
chains
Most SME domestic producers are
not certified
Third tier cannot afford to pay
certifications

Most (85 %) SME export companies have
CSR certifications
Shared with workers the above norms and
cultural practices
Contradiction of ‘small loans’ (or
advances) to workers
Contributions to local communities,
households, temples, churches

Source The authors

Second, in the realm of regulation, we found mixed
effects of three levels of regulation. State regulation and
transnational third-party monitoring are not always effective, which has given rise to ‘invisible’ SME subcontractors at the bottom rung of the global supply chain.
While government industrial policies which invest in
learning and skills training in the TGF sector can improve
wages and working conditions (Tran 2012), state regulation can disadvantage SMEs by increasing inspection
costs and requiring them to produce time-consuming
reports.
As shown in Table 5, the state—in both its formal and
quasi-formal roles—continues to play a vital role in both
labor and environmental regulations. But workers correctly
pointed out that labor inspections have been more lax
compared to environmental inspections. This again shows
the prioritized attention going to the quality of the products
or the public perception of waste, not to the workers’
welfare. We found that many workers did not comply with
some crude measures of protection—such as wearing
protective masks—on the shop floor. But workers’ compliance would depend on management’s compliance (with
CSR) in providing workers with decent working conditions
in the first place. For instance, the temperatures in TGF
factories are often high and workspaces often lack proper
ventilation, thus even when workers recognize the health
benefits of wearing masks, they may choose not to wear
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them even when available37 simply because it is unbearable to work in such conditions.
Moreover, transnational private monitoring—such as
third-party global monitors or auditors and the Japanese
buyers’ 5 S System (whose services are most likely paid for
by the MNCs and/or their suppliers)—tend to focus on the
consistent quality of the products, not the well-being of
workers. Moreover, unequal power relations in global
supply chains are demonstrated by MNCs and their East
Asian suppliers who provide their own fabrics and accessories (from external sources) to their SME subcontractors
and do not list the SMEs in their supplier list, thus not
requiring codes-of-conduct compliance.
The third insight concerns the contradictions of the
often-cited ‘small loans’ (see Table 5), demonstrating the
unequal gender relations in SME settings, where most
bosses are men. In reality, these ‘short-term loans’ are
merely advances to workers that management immediately
deduct from workers’ next pay checks, so the latter receive
a lesser amount on pay days. While these small advances
are essential so that workers can pay for their basic necessities, medical expenses, or trips to home for family
matters, this common practice reinforces the paternal relationships, perpetuates the cycle of indebtedness and
37

But overall, many managers do not provide masks to workers to
save costs.
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precarious hand-to-mouth existence of many workers, and
does not solve the root cause of the shortages: non-livable
wages.

Concluding Remarks
Our study with concrete fieldwork interviews forefronts the
voices of SME managers and workers to fill the gap in the
literature on CSR in SMEs, an area with limited contributions. Though CSR policies often promote livable wages
and benefits, safe and clean working conditions, and a
sustainable environment, implementation of CSR practices
comes with a cost. Our findings show that, ultimately, the
managers and the workers in these SMEs absorb the costs
or the CSR practices are not implemented because the
business case for CSR in SMEs cannot be identified or
because the western concept of CSR is not understood by
managers and workers.
Showcasing the voices of managers and workers from
SMEs in once-socialist Vietnam, a particular ‘‘Southern
perspective,’’ reveals what CSR really means to them:
socially responsible practices and expectations that had
been happening long before the arrival of CSR as a western
concept. These two key stakeholders recognize the shared
conceptions of socially and culturally responsible behaviors in SME settings, with many workers interpreting (and
complying with) factory regulations as if they were codes
of conduct.
We are conscious of the mixed results of some informal
practices—informed by social and cultural expectations—
that might perpetuate dependency and differential power
relations between employers and employees. But we found
that in spite of the spread of global capitalism—or the
integration of Vietnam into the global supply chains since
the late 1990s—shared understanding, norms and socialist
values do not become homogenized; they sustain. On the
one hand, it is true that ‘small loans’ or ‘wage advancement’ given to workers—to be deducted in the next paycheck—can perpetuate dependency toward a particular
SME owner who needs to keep workers in a tight labor
market for SMEs. On the other hand, it is not a ‘‘race-tothe-bottom’’: management could not sacrifice all standards
when global competitive pressures demand it, because
workers in these SMEs do have some bargaining power to
demand other concessions from management, as shown in
their interviews: flexible working hours (important for
young women taking care of their families), livable wages
(higher than the minimum wage), and good working relations with both management and co-workers. These worker
requests are also dictated by shared understanding and
practices in existence long before CSR’s arrival to
Vietnam.
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The emphasis of the CSR agenda tends to be dictated by
and biased toward the interests of MNCs, as pointed out by
the critical perspectives presented above. Such direction
shapes the language and application of formal and informal
practices (Blowfield and Frynas 2005) and explains why
we found widespread informal and limited formal CSR
practices among SMEs in Vietnam. This study demonstrates the unequal power relations in the global supply
chains, with MNCs showcasing CSR to appease consumers
but placing the onus of both practice and proof onto those
on lower tiers, which increases the costs of doing business
for their suppliers and the SME subcontractors, leaving less
for workers’ wages. Most interviewed SME managers—in
third or the fourth tier of the global value chains—expressed knowledge about CSR but stated that they cannot
afford to be certified in codes of conduct, to remedy the
‘code violations,’ or to produce time-consuming ‘sustainability/responsibility reports.’ SME management perspectives clearly point to the MNC’s failure to share the costs of
implementing and monitoring CSR practices.
What can be done to improve these conditions in Vietnam? It takes both domestic and international stakeholders
to address these concerns. First, MNCs need to share the
CSR costs with the SMEs, because after all, it is corporate
social responsibility to implement the stated intention of
CSR to improve conditions in SME factories, in conjunction with the shared understandings, norms, and practices
of workers and managers in Vietnam. International NGOs
are to be commended for their constructive works, such as
the ongoing efforts of Action Aid to empower local villagers in Vietnam to improve their working and physical
environments. Second, both workers and managers pointed
to the need for stronger state enforcement of the Labor
Code. A collaboration of private and state regulation could
be a win–win outcome for all stakeholders: for instance,
the MNCs can finance impartial NGOs, with good track
record on transparency, to monitor labor standards in the
SMEs working in their supply chains. Third, MNCs should
offer and finance the costs of training courses on codes of
conduct at SME level so that workers can have a proper
understanding of their rights promised by the stated CSR
intentions in order to empower their bargaining positions.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Detailed Information on Categories
of Questions Asked to 20 Interviewed SMEs (Managers
and Workers) in the TGF Sector in Vietnam
Based on this literature, we used a four-dimensional approach to explore formal and ‘informal’ CSR practices
when interviewing representatives from SMEs. The formal
CSR practices include (1) physical environment, (2)
working environment, and (3) labor standards/working
conditions. The informal CSR practices include (4) informal arrangements between management and employees
(such as loans, various types of leave) and support to the
local communities and others (e.g., in the form of donations of money or in kind, or in personal involvement).
On formal CSR practices, we inquired about the systems, code certifications, and compliance activities in three
areas: labor standards, the working environment, and the
physical environment. With respect to informal CSR
practices, our culturally sensitive questions covered Vietnamese cultural practices embedded in their changing
politico-economic contexts, since the market reform in the
late 1980s and the historical legacy. For example, we inquired about ‘informal assistance to workers’ and included
possible responses such as loans, different types of leave,
and others. On ‘support to local communities and organizations,’ we included responses such as monetary and/or
in-kind contributions to local religious centers, schools,
youth clubs, sports clubs, and other community-based organizations, and goals. On ‘involvement in community
work,’ we elicited open-ended responses that revealed a
wide array of cultural- and country-specific activities by
managers and workers in Vietnam.
In particular, to explore how SME managers understand
various formal practices such as codes of conduct, we
asked 20 questions related to the cognitive level which
addressed all relevant stakeholders, both internal and external to the SMEs, based on the exploratory component.
We then asked 35 questions addressing both the cognitive
and regulatory levels to investigate how managers understand and actually perform their company responsibilities,
given the historical legacy and cultural context (informal
practices). These questions elicited the country-specific
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contexts of modern-day socialist Vietnam. To show relations between SME managers and workers, we asked five
questions. Moreover, we asked 21 questions to reveal the
perspectives of other relevant stakeholders and their impacts on labor–management–state relations, such as corporate buyers, first-tier and second-tier suppliers,
government and labor union officials, local communities,
NGOs, and other global actors.
First, we interviewed the managers based on a qualitative, in-depth interview format for owners/managers asking
the categories of questions mentioned above. Second, we
interviewed 125 workers in 14 SMEs, using three types of
semi-structured questionnaires for focus-group, individual
and in-depth interviews. The Vietnamese team was able to
do this thanks to their extensive ongoing contacts with
local labor unions and government officials. Third, we
conducted follow-up interviews with managers using the
more quantitative or structured questionnaire that focused
on changes over time (in five years) in labor standards and
environmental aspects.
Appendix 2: A Note on the Application of Rawls’
Arguments to Vietnam and this Study
Rawls’ theory of justice is premised on a liberal society in
which the citizens are free with basic equal rights and the
political system is democratic and legitimate. His argument
of ‘‘justice as fairness’’ is based on a ‘‘well-ordered society’’; the basic structure of this society is characterized by
the main political and social institutions being publicly
known ‘‘to satisfy principles of justice.’’ In this wellordered democratic society, Rawls argues that the citizens
develop their moral powers and become fully cooperating
members: understand and apply the publicly recognized
principles of justice, and adjudicate their claims of political
right on those political institutions (Rawls 2001, pp. 8–9,
57). However, the one-party Socialist Vietnam is not a
well-ordered democratic society. Its basic structure, sanctioned by the Eighth Party Congress in 1996 as a ‘‘socialist
state governed by the rule of law,’’ is undermined by the
Communist Party government which has not respected the
supposed separation of powers (the Politburo, the National
Assembly, and the Judiciary). There is no moral division of
labor between the branches of the government and the citizens they purport to represent, because the state arbitrarily has enforced some laws and not others, while the
citizens have had to fight for their basic rights (Tran 2013,
pp. 3–6). The socialist legacy of ensuring equity, or equal
distribution of wealth and income, has some connection to
Rawls’ second part of the second principle of justice: the
greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society
(the difference principle) (Rawls 2001, pp. 42–43). But
fundamental contradictions inherent in Vietnam’s ‘‘market
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economy with socialist orientation’’ have greatly diminished, if not prevented, the fulfillment of this sense of
justice and equity on behalf of its citizens in socialist
Vietnam (Tran 2013, pp. 261–289).
In thinking further about Rawls’ two principles of justice (pp. 42–43): the first principle does not apply to
Vietnamese citizens as each person does not have ‘‘the
same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties.’’ The Communist Party members and
former government officials (Party members) have power,
privileges and access not accessible to all citizens. In the
context of CSR, public regulation of CSR is controlled by
state and quasi-state institutions as discussed in the
Meaning of Regulatory System in Vietnam section. The
second principle of ‘‘offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity’’ also does not
apply to Vietnam since, in reality, political power is
dominated by Communist Party members: over 90 % of
seats in the National Assembly of Vietnam are held by
Communist Party members (only a minority were independent members).
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